

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ALL ARA INFORMATION POSTED (except KINGSTON and PORT-OF-SPAIN) USSR New York 11/23/62

INFO: POLAR CINCINNATI, POLAR CINCINNATI, KINGSTON, PORT-OF-SPAIN, LONDON, PARIS, USSR.

Department regards informal MFM as highly successful. Communiqué is strongest unanimous statement on Cuban problem yet to emerge from gathering of all American governments. Both by itself and as impetus for follow-up action on 8th MFM decisions it should have helpful political and psychological, and, to limited extent economic, impact in promoting our twin objectives of (1) making it as expensive as possible for USSR to maintain Cuba and (2) isolating Cuba and thereby reducing subversive, political and psychological usefulness of Cuba to Soviets. Re US opinion communiqué helpful in meeting criticism of OARs and OAS for disinterest and inaction.

Discussions characterized by friendly and cooperative spirit and high degree of frankness which reflected in communiqué. Strength of communiqué lies not only in content but also fact it reflects unanimous agreement with no abstentions or reservations. Document contains all essential points we desired. If phraseology not as strong or specific as we would have preferred on some aspects, particularly in condemning Castro regime, this due stand taken by countries maintaining relations with Cuba. They agreed oppressive nature Castro regime and suffering Cuban people but feared adverse effect their relations if meeting too outspoken this matter.

Drafted by:

ARA:WPA:WGBowdler:sn

10/8/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

ARA:WPA:Ward P. Allen

Clearance:

ARA - Mr. Martin

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Features of communique which further USG objectives re Cuba are:

1. Recognition of Soviet effort convert Cuba into armed base for penetration of Hemisphere and subversion its democratic institutions.
2. Agreement OAS bodies should intensify efforts to carry out assignments regarding Cuban situation and be ready move quickly if situation calls for additional action. (This refers particularly to action under Rio Treaty.)
3. Consensus that studies on subversive travel, funds and propaganda should be done pursuant Resolution II of 8th NFM without delay.
4. Consensus that recent events in Cuba warrant action under Resolution VIII of 8th NFM including use of American Republic ships in Cuban trade, accompanied by appeal to other independent countries to review their Cuban trade and use of ships.
5. Recognition that Soviet intervention in Cuba is not analogous to, and cannot be justified by, defensive measures which other Free World countries have taken against Soviet imperialism, (e.g. bases in Turkey).
6. Recognition that threat of Cuban subversion manifests itself differently pursuant paragraph 3 of Resolution II of 8th NFM in different areas of Hemisphere calling for special measures to deal with it/
as
(Caribbean generally recognised/area of greater danger although this not specifically stated.)
7. Voicing of deep sympathy with the Cuban people over their plight.

Views expressed in communique provide us with basis for pressing for action in individual countries
COAS, /joining with Caribbean countries in special measures along lines DEPCIRTEL 517, and urging NATO and other Free World countries support American Republics in their efforts isolate Cuba.

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Text of communique carried in wireless file.

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CIRCULAR 596

ACTION: ALL ARA DIPLOMATIC POSTS (except Kingston and
USUN New York Port-of-Spain)

INFO: POLAD CINCARIB, POLAD CINCLANT, KINGSTON, PORT-OF-SPAIN, LONDON,
PARIS, USRO

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(Caribbean generally recognized as area of greater danger although this not specifically stated.)
7. Voicing of deep sympathy with the Cuban people over their plight. Views expressed in communique provide us with basis for pressing for action in COAS, in individual countries joining with Caribbean countries in special measures along lines DEPCIRTEL 517, and urging NATO and other Free World countries support American republics in their efforts isolate Cuba.

Text of communiqué carried in wireless file.

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